ISIS’s declaration of establishing a caliphate in June 2014 had perplexed and shocked masses of the world’s population. Coupled with horrific crimes and murders it appeared to be establishing some backward pre-historic era which the modern world has supposedly ‘progressed’ away from. The biggest problem for the commentators was the sheer complexity of the situation, as this claim for re-establishing of the caliphate was tangled with various strands from theology, jurisprudence, history and geo-politics. But a central and basic question which emerged was what is the caliphate and what has it meant to Muslims throughout the ages? It is this question which Mona Hassan attempts to address in this volume.
Hassan analysis two periods in history when the Muslim world had lost its Caliph, the first period being the sacking of Baghdad in 1258CE and the subsequent execution of the Abbasid Caliph, al-Mu’taṡim, by the Mongol forces. The second period is the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate by the order of Mustafa Kemal (d.1953). Although she offers details and analysis of the two abolitions, it’s the reaction of the Muslim community which is focused upon. The book is divided into an Introduction with six chapters and an epilogue.
The introduction offers a brief overview of the caliphate during and shortly after the Prophetic era, and then jumps to the Abbasid period and finally the Ottoman period. One of the aims of the study is to correct the misnomer amongst many academics that ‘’making up of the ‘shadow-caliphate’ at Cairo made no difference, since few if any jurists of that period recognized it’’1 (p.4). But the overarching goal is to explore the impact the caliphate and the meanings derived from this institution by various facets of Muslim societies. So, although a normal study on the caliphate would return to the books of the Muslim jurists, Hassan also gives a voice to ‘exegetes, traditionalists, theologians, historians, musicians, poets, intellectuals, bureaucrats, activists and journalists’ (p.15). This is naturally an exhaustive task when also taking into consideration the large geographical area where Muslims lived and produced an immense amount of intellectual output. Its due to this that Hassan in studying the Abbasids (post sacking of Baghdad) limited herself mainly within the span of Egypt (being home of the resuscitated Abbasid caliphate) and in the case of the Ottomans figures in Turkey and Egypt.
Chapter 1 discusses the actual sacking of Baghdad through the lens of various figures. Hassan demonstrates that the abolition of the caliphate sparked a wide cry of anguish from all over the Muslim world. In a diagram (p.24-25) showing the geographical locations of the authors and poets mourning the incident, it can be seen that it had spread as far-east as Delhi and to the West at Granada and Cordoba. Utilizing a vast array of sources, Hassan knits together the views of Muslims from various disciplines united on the feeling of shock and disgust. An interesting section describes the rise of eschatological beliefs linked to the sacking (p.57-65) demonstrating the deep symbolic nature of the caliphate despite the weak state of the Abbasid before 1258.
Chapter 2 maps the journey of Rukn al-Dīn Baybars (d.1277) and his usage of the Abbasid claim to the caliphate to cement his own position as the leader in Egypt. Hassan explains that Baybars’ ascension to the throne was via a complicated string of events and his authority and legitimacy was still open to be challenged by the religious elite. A case in point is al-‘Izz ibn ‘Abd al-Salām (d.1262) challenging the Mamluk amīr’s legitimacy as leader due to it not yet being established whether he had been freed (p.67). So Baybars’ reestablishment of the Abbasid caliphate through the Caliph al-Mustanṡir (d.1261) through an elaborate ceremony, presented the Mamluks as heroes for Muslims. It was the setup of government which was a potential cause of concern, as the Caliph discharged all his powers to the sulṭān Baybars, leaving the role of the caliphate, to use Gibb’s term, a ‘shadow-caliphate’. The rest of the chapter highlights the mass approval and recognition of the second phase of the Abbasid caliphate. It also discusses the failure of rival attempts of contesting caliphates. Hassan brings examples of internal problems of the new form of governance where the sulṭān yielding real power while the religious, and many times public, support is for the Caliph.
The 3rd chapter deals with the efforts of Muslim jurists to reconceptualise the caliphate in an ever changing world. The Muslim world had moved pretty far from the simple era of the Prophet and the ‘rightly guided khulāfa’, and the jurists had to apply their learning to make sense of the world around them. Hassan makes the point that the obligation of a Caliph was an accepted obligation amongst earlier jurists, with the exception of ‘deviated’ figures like al-Aṡamm (d.816). The jurists chosen by Hassan vary in terms of popularity (which is measured via the interest later scholars had in their political thought). So well-known figures like al-Juwaynī (d.1085) and Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328) are looked at as well as lesser-known figures such as al-Tursūsī (d.1357) and al-Dhahabī (d.1348) (although he was highly celebrated and influential as a traditionalist, his political thought is largely unknown). Al-Juwaynī naturally pre-dates the Mamluk period but his unique work Ghiyāth al-Umam is in response to a similar setting where the Abbasid Caliph yields minimum power. So instead of regarding the caliphate as a dead institute, he reconceptualises the idea to fit the ‘increasingly dire circumstances yet to come’ (p.107). Likewise al-Ghazālī (d.1111) is cited of accepting that many conditions of the caliphate are absent but we have to accept it based on circumstances and necessity.
Hassan points out that the claim that it was Badr al-Dīn Ibn Jamā’ah (d.1333) who introduced the notion that ‘caliphal rule was justified by sheer military force, or ghalabah’ (p.108). This, Hassan demonstrates, actually has an earlier precedent such as in the political views of Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (d.855). Likewise Hassan corrects the view put forward by Henry Laoust that Ibn Taymiyyah considered the sacking of Baghdad as the end of the caliphate. Rather his position was far more nuanced, in his explanation of the tradition that the caliphate will only last only 30 years which would thereafter be followed by kingship (mulk), Ibn Taymiyyah discusses the legal implications of mulkiyyah. In response to mulkiyyah, there are four main Muslim responses; with two being extremes while two being centrist. Out of the two centrist positions, one is to not accept that mulkiyyah in essence is not acceptable (jawāz aṡlī) but it is permissible out of need. Although the khilāfah al-nubuwwah is the original obligation but can be side stepped due to necessity (ḥājah). The second centrist view considers the khilāfah al-nubuwwah as meritorious (mustaḥabb) which allows a legal space for mulkiyyah, as long as it can fulfil the intent of the public office. As for the first of the two extreme positions, which Ibn Taymiyyah ascribes to the Khawārij and Mu’tazilah, is that khilāfah al-nubuwwah is an obligation under all circumstances and condemn all who fall short of it (yūjibu dhālika fī kulli ḥālin wa-zamānin wa-‘alā kulli aḥadin wa-yadhummu man kharaja ‘an dhālika muṭlaqan aw li-ḥājatin). As for the opposite extreme of the Murji’ah, then it is to state that mulkiyyah is unconditionally permissible and do not hold them to any standard (p.112). The idea then put forth in response to the Abbasid-Mamluk rule was of legitimacy despite falling far from khilāfah al-nubuwwah but keeping up constant advice (naṡīḥah) so that they may better themselves. The rest of the chapter attempts to pick out the nuance of the various jurists in their political thought but the legitimacy and respect to the symbol of the Abbasid Caliphs was a consistent theme.
The second half of the book (chapters 4-6) then moves to the second destruction of the caliphate. The Ottoman caliphate received large scale Muslim legitimacy and with the increase of colonial encroachment on Muslim lands, the symbolic representation of the Ottoman Caliph had come to its peak. For example the Egyptian poet, Aḥmad Shawqī (d.1932), declared
‘O House of Othman! Our cousins! How could you complain of a wound,
and we do not complain of its pain?
We sympathise with you and do not forget
our homeland (waṭan), throne, crown, or (national) flag. (p.150)
Similar to the sacking of Baghdad, but on a much larger scale due to the advancement in technology and information travelling fast, the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate by Kemal Ataturk was felt far and wide. Hassan details the inner Turkish opposition to the Ataturk’s decision and his subsequent silence of opposition. Likewise the worry and concern of many Muslim figures and organisations felt globally. Although an impossible task to discuss all the reactions to the fall of the Ottomans in a single volume, the work pleasantly highlights key events and figures. Sharīf Ḥusayn (d.1931) is given as an example of someone who wanted to take the role of the Caliph and after the Ottoman fall, did manage to gather a large following (p.173-183). Other figures were also put forward as possible candidates, again demonstrating the fact that the notion of a caliphate, despite the various meanings it generated for its advocates, continued to hold dear in the hearts of many.
Chapter 5 deals with attempts to re-establish the caliphate with the major focus being on the Azhar international conference which was planned for this goal. The conference, which began with high hopes, did end up as a failure due to various reasons detailed by Hassan. Regardless of the outcome, pro-caliphate tendencies are shown to have been a common feeling with support for the conference coming from places like China and Russia. Indian sentiments are not explored too widely with the exception of Ināyatullāh Mashriqī (d.1963) due to him being the lone Indian at the Azhar conference. The Khilāfat movement in India has already been given much attention in academia, so exploring that end would have been repetitive and outside the scope of the current study. The chapter ends with an acknowledgment of the conference’s failure but some positivity did result from it. The writings of the famed ‘Abd al-Razzāq al-Sanhūrī (d.1971) is presented as a continuation of the 1926 Azhar conference (p.214-216).
The final chapter analyses the juristic response to the absence of a caliphate. Post-sacking of Baghdad the jurists were challenged with a new system of governance and had to reconceptualise their previous notions of the role of the Caliph. Even with the Ottoman claim to the caliphate, the condition that the vast majority of jurist had put forth of the Caliph having to be of Qurashī descent, had to be conceded. The deteriorating state of the Ottoman caliphate and its subsequent end generated competing reactions. Mehmed Sayyid Çelebizade (d.1925) on the behest of Mustafa Kemal wrote a treatise arguing against the need to the caliphate. Interestingly he utilizes the Mamluk model to substantiate that there was a separation between the caliphate and the sultanate (p.223). The caliphate was purely symbolic and now there is no need of the symbolism, those who argue to the contrary are shallow in their knowledge of Islamic law. It was a few years after this treatise that the infamous ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Rāziq (1966) wrote his ‘al-Islām wa Usūl al-Ḥukm’ which does a total rejection of the institution of the caliphate. The historical and political background is given of the book as well as the various responses given by the Muslim scholars. An interesting response discussed is that of the last şeyhülislam of the Ottoman caliphate Mustafa Sabrī (d.1954). His treatise was in response to Çelebizade’s treatise where Sabrī charges him with only pointing out the ‘low points of the institution’, and furthermore that there is no comparison between the current situation with the Mamluk form of governance (simple fact being that one still upheld Islam while the others did not). In an unexpected twist Sabrī states that the two essential components of a caliphate is government (ḥukūmah) and faithful representation of the Prophet (niyābah)’. This was followed on by Sabrī conceding to the possibility of there to be a multiplicity of caliphates, although one was ideal, that goal was looking more and more impossible (p.238-239). So, in the same procedure of the Muslim jurists of the past, certain well known conditions of the ideal caliphate had be done away with due to realities of the time, Sabrī felt the need to do the same. Many other figures are also touched upon in the chapter such as Muḥammad Khiḍr Ḥusayn and Said Nursi (d.1960).
The epilogue comes in the form of a conclusion and looks at how many of these ideas influenced movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qā’idāh. It also finds parallels in modern Christianity and its question of Christendom (p.256). It also reiterates the point that despite the idea of the caliphate being shared pretty broadly, the conceptualization of the institution, especially in the modern context, is highly diverse.
Hassan’s book does an excellent job at covering a diverse and vast arena of history, geography, politics and jurisprudence, only a few of which I have mentioned above. Due to the fact that many of the figures studied in the book have been analysed before, there is some repetition, but there are many new figures which are put on the scene and nuances highlighted. A natural problem with such a study, the breadth of it makes it feel as if figures are being rushed through and not adequately dealt with. The positive side being that it allows future researchers various possible areas to conduct further investigation. Although I would not classify it as ground-breaking, it surely does contribute to our understanding of Muslim relationship to the caliphate.
Zeeshan Chaudri (2016)
(Imam Zakariya Academy)
Picture credit: https://wardahbooks.com/products/longingforthelostcaliphate
